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The initial stage of Donald Trump's Middle East plan has elicited a collective feeling of reassurance among EU officials. After two years of bloodshed, the truce, hostage exchanges, limited Israeli military withdrawal, and aid delivery provide optimism – and unfortunately, create an excuse for Europe to continue inaction.

The EU's Problematic Position on the Gaza War

When it comes to the war in Gaza, unlike the Russian aggression in Ukraine, EU member states have revealed their worst colours. They are divided, causing policy paralysis. More alarming than inaction is the accusation of complicity in Israel's war crimes. EU bodies have been unwilling to apply leverage on the perpetrators while maintaining commercial, political, and defense cooperation.

Israel's violations have triggered mass outrage among European citizens, yet EU governments have become disconnected with their own people, especially youth. In 2020, the EU spearheaded the environmental movement, responding to youth demands. Those same youth are now appalled by their leaders' inaction over Gaza.

Belated Recognition and Ineffective Measures

Only after 24 months of a war that numerous observers call a atrocity for multiple EU countries including Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta to acknowledge the Palestinian state, following Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia's lead from the previous year.

Only recently did the European Commission propose the first timid punitive measures toward Israel, including sanctioning radical officials and violent settlers, plus halting European trade benefits. Nevertheless, neither step have been enacted. The initial requires complete consensus among all member states – improbable given fierce resistance from nations including Hungary and the Czech Republic. The other could pass with a qualified majority, but Germany and Italy's opposition have made it meaningless.

Contrasting Responses and Damaged Credibility

In June, the EU found that Israel had violated its human rights obligations under the bilateral trade deal. But recently, the EU's top diplomat halted efforts to suspend the preferential trade terms. The difference with the EU's multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia could not be more pronounced. On Ukraine, Europe has taken a principled stand for freedom and international law; on Gaza, it has damaged its reputation in the international community.

The US Initiative as an Convenient Excuse

Now, Trump's plan has offered Europe with an escape route. It has allowed European governments to support US requirements, like their stance on Ukraine, security, and commerce. It has permitted them to trumpet a new dawn of stability in the Middle East, shifting attention from punitive measures toward European support for the US plan.

The EU has withdrawn into its comfort zone of playing second fiddle to the United States. While Arab and Muslim majority countries are expected to bear responsibility for an peacekeeping mission in Gaza, European governments are lining up to participate with humanitarian assistance, rebuilding, administrative help, and border monitoring. Talk of pressure on Israel has virtually disappeared.

Implementation Challenges and Political Realities

This situation is understandable. The US initiative is the sole existing framework and undoubtedly the only plan with some possibility, however small, of achievement. This is not due to the intrinsic value of the proposal, which is problematic at best. It is rather because the United States is the sole actor with sufficient influence over Israel to alter behavior. Supporting US diplomacy is therefore not just convenient for Europeans, it is logical too.

However, executing the initiative after its first phase is more challenging than anticipated. Multiple hurdles and catch-22s exist. Israel is unlikely to completely withdraw from Gaza unless Hamas lays down weapons. But Hamas will not surrender entirely unless Israel withdraws.

Future Prospects and Required Action

The plan aims to transition toward local administration, first involving local experts and then a "restructured" Palestinian Authority. But administrative reform means radically different things to the Americans, Europe, Arab nations, and the local population. Israel rejects the authority altogether and, with it, the idea of a independent Palestine.

Israel's leadership has been explicitly clear in repeating its unchanged aim – the destruction of Hamas – and has studiously avoided addressing an end to the war. It has not fully respected the truce: since it began, dozens of non-combatants have been killed by IDF operations, while additional individuals have been shot by militant groups.

Without the global community, and especially the US and Europe, exert greater pressure on Israel, the odds are that widespread conflict will restart, and Gaza – as well as the West Bank – will continue being occupied. In short, the remaining points of the plan will not be implemented.

Conclusion

This is why Europeans are mistaken to consider support for Trump's plan and leveraging Israel as distinct or contradictory. It is politically convenient but practically incorrect to see the first as part of the paradigm of peace and the latter to one of continuing war. This is not the moment for the EU and its constituent countries to feel let off the hook, or to discard the first timid moves toward punitive measures and requirements.

Leverage exerted on Israel is the sole method to overcome diplomatic obstacles, and if successful, Europe can ultimately make a small – but positive, at least – contribution to stability in the region.